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This paper shows that all perfect Bayesian equilibria of a dynamic matching game with
two-sided incomplete information of independent private values variety are asymptotically
Walrasian. Buyers purchase a bundle of heterogeneous, indivisible goods and sellers own
one unit of an indivisible good. Buyer preferences and endowments as well as seller costs
are private information. Agents engage in costly search and meet randomly. The terms of
trade are determined through a Bayesian mechanism proposal game. The paper considers a
market in steady state. As discounting and the xed cost of search become small, all trade
takes place at a Walrasian price. However, a robust example is presented where the limit
price vector is a Walrasian price for an economy where only a strict subsets of the goods
in the original economy are traded, i.e, markets are missing at the limit. Nevertheless,
there exists a sequence of equilibria that converge to a Walrasian equilibria for the whole
economy where all markets are open.
Keywords: Matching and Bargaining, Search, Foundations for Perfect Competition, Two-
sided Incomplete Information
JEL Classication Numbers: C73, C78, D83.
1. Introduction
This paper shows that all equilibria of a dynamic matching game with two-sided in-
complete information of the independent private values variety converge to Walrasian (or
competitive) equilibria, as search frictions disappear. In the model each buyer aims to
purchase a bundle of heterogeneous, indivisible objects and each seller owns one unit of
a heterogeneous indivisible good (as in Kelso and Crawford (1982) or Gul and Stacchetti
(1999)). Buyer preferences and endowments as well as seller costs are private information.
Agents engage in costly search and meet randomly in a market that remains in steady state.
The terms of trade are determined through a Bayesian mechanism proposal game.
Numerous researchers have explored the non-cooperative foundations for competitive
equilibria in indivisible goods markets using dynamic matching games. Previous work has
Date: First version February, 2007. This version July, 2008.
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focused almost exclusively on markets for an homogeneous good and has assumed complete
information until recently. In particular, Gale (1987) and Mortensen and Wright (2002)
establish convergence of dynamic matching game equilibria to competitive equilibria as
search friction disappear under complete information, while Satterthwaite and Shneyerov
(2007) extend the analysis to the two-sided incomplete information case.
Often cited examples of markets, where indivisible goods are exchanged through bilateral
negotiations, are the labor and the housing markets. Although cited as motivating examples,
neither of these markets t the mold of a market for an homogeneous good where buyers only
dier in their valuations for the good, and sellers only dier in their cost of providing the
good. For example, in the labor market potential employees dier in their productivity and
their disutility of labor. Firms usually search for multiple employees, that may complement
or substitute each other. Also, the vacancies in the rms are rarely exactly alike, and
an employees productivity may depend crucially on the type of vacancy that a rm has
available. In the housing market the potential homes are far from being homogenous and
buyers in search of homes may have diverse needs. Moreover, many home purchases are
bundles that include the home, nearby parking, architectural services for the home and
brokerage services for the transaction. This paper presents a dynamic matching game, with
two sided incomplete information, that preserves many of the attributes of markets such as
the labor market and the housing market.
A brief description of the model presented here is as follows: In each period a unit
measure of each type (of buyers and sellers) from a nite set of types is available for entry
and those who expect a non-negative return voluntarily enter the market. The market is in
steady-state with the measure of agent types endogenously determined to balance the ow
of types through the economy. Once in the market, each agent pays a per period cost, and
receives a \draw" from the distribution of active players. Also, nding a bargaining partner
takes time and agents discount the future. The probability that any buyer (or seller) is
paired with a particular type is proportional to the frequency of that type among all sellers
(buyers) active in steady state. After two agents are paired, nature designates a proposer,
the proposer oers a mechanism, and the responder decides whether to participate (i.e.,
the Bayesian mechanism proposal game of Maskin and Tirole (1990) is played). During
this bargaining stage buyer preferences and endowments, as well as, seller costs are private
information. The good that the seller oers, however, is observed by the buyer. If a meeting
between a pair results in a trade, then the seller leaves the market, otherwise the agents
return to the population of active players. Buyers leave the market voluntarily after they
have purchased all the goods that they want.COMPETITIVE MATCHING 3
The competitive equilibrium benchmark under consideration is a \ow" equilibrium as in
Gale (1987) or Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007), generalized to accommodate heteroge-
nous goods and multi-unit demand. In each period, ow supply is the measure of sellers of
a particular good entering the market and ow demand is the measure of agents willing to
purchase a particular good entering the market. In a ow equilibrium, the buyer and seller
continuation values, which are the implicit prices, equate ow supply to ow demand for
each of the goods traded in the market.
The rst central result of this paper shows that as the discount factor  ! 1 and the
explicit search costs c ! 0, all trade takes place at competitive prices. As search becomes
increasingly cheap, buyers wait until they have accumulated their most favored bundle.
While accumulating these goods, buyers reject \high" prices. Also, sellers become more
discerning and wait until they receive the best price oer possible. At the limit incomplete
information stops playing a role, trade in each good occurs at a unique price and each buyer
purchases their most preferred bundle at these prices. However, the limit price vector may
not comprise a competitive price vector for the whole economy. Instead, the limit price may
be a competitive price vector for a economy where only a strict subset of goods are traded.
This is because markets for some goods are possibly \closed" (or \missing") at the limit.
The second central result of this paper establishes that a search equilibrium exists for any
conguration of search frictions. In this equilibrium all proposers optimally choose take-it-
or-leave-it oers ( a la Riley and Zeckhauser (1983)) from a rich set of possible mechanisms.
Also, when small search frictions are small, the paper shows that an equilibrium exists where
the markets for all goods are open. Consequently, there exists a sequence of equilibria that
converge to a competitive equilibrium for the whole economy.
Although the literature on dynamic matching and search is vast, Satterthwaite and
Shneyerov (2007) is the work most closely related to this one. Satterthwaite and Shneyerov
(2007) established that equilibria of a dynamic matching game converge to a competitive
equilibrium in the case of a single homogeneous good and two sided incomplete informa-
tion. Also, in a market for a homogeneous good, Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2008) show
convergence to a competitive equilibrium with an exogenously given exit rate; Lauermann
(2008) shows convergence does not depend on the distribution of bargaining power; and
Shneyerov and Wong (2007) establish results on the rate of convergence.
The analysis provided here diers from the previous literature in two main respects.
First, the homogeneous good, unit demand restrictions are lifted. In a search market for
a homogeneous good the limit of any sequence of stable equilibria is competitive and so
ecient. In contrast, with heterogeneous goods, there are robust examples where some4 ALP E. ATAKAN
markets are closed at the limit and the limit equilibrium is inecient.1 Second, in all
previous work the bargaining protocol, that governs the interaction of buyers and sellers, is
exogenously imposed. For example, in Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007), Satterthwaite
and Shneyerov (2008) and Shneyerov and Wong (2007) the buyers and sellers that meet,
are assumed to participate in a double auction where any seller bids her continuation value
truthfully. In contrast, here the proposer is allowed to choose any nite mechanism. So,
strategic behavior is allowed for both the proposing and responding agents and also a
large set of bargaining protocols are permitted. Consequently, the results here show that
an asymptotically ecient bargaining protocol will be endogenously chosen by individual
agents in equilibrium.
In related models presented in DeFraja and Sakovics (2001), Serrano (2002) and Wolin-
sky (1990), convergence to a competitive equilibrium fails. The failure of convergence to
competitive equilibrium is caused by the bilateral bargaining protocol in Serrano (2002);
results from the ineciency of aggregating common value information through bilateral
meeting in Wolinsky (1990); and is due to a \clones" assumption in DeFraja and Sakovics
(2001) (see Lauermann (2006) for a detailed discussion of these issues).
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines the dynamic matching and bargaining
game as well as the competitive benchmark, Section 3.1 presents the main results that show
convergence to a competitive equilibrium, Section 3.2 outlines the equilibrium existence
argument, and Section 4 concludes. Proofs that are not included in the main text are in
the Appendix.
2. The Model
Buyers and sellers in the economy search for possible trading partners over the innite
horizon. Each seller owns one indivisible good for sale and each buyer wants to purchase a
bundle of the indivisible goods oered for sale. The game progresses in discrete time and
agents discount the future with a common discount factor  = e r 2 [0;1], where  is the
period length and r is the discount rate. In each period, an agent incurs a positive explicit
search cost c =  > 0 and meets pairwise with a potential partner.2 Either the buyer
or the seller is designated as the proposer and then the pair play a three-stage Bayesian
mechanism choice game. The mechanism choice game is exactly the game thoroughly
analyzed in Maskin and Tirole (1990). The probability that the buyer is designated as the
1With a homogeneous good there is always a no trade equilibrium. However, this equilibrium is not stable.
In contrast, with heterogeneous goods Example 1 demonstrates a sequence of stable equilibria with an
inecient limit.
2Although, I assume that all agents share a common discount factor  and explicit search cost, c, this is for
convenience only. All results in the paper go through even if agents have heterogeneous search costs.COMPETITIVE MATCHING 5
proposer is  2 (0;1). In the rst stage, the proposer oers a mechanism chosen from the
set of feasible mechanisms. Throughout the paper assume that a take-it-or-leave-it oer
is a feasible mechanism choice for the proposer. In section 3, the argument for existence
further assumes that the set of feasible mechanisms is the set of all nite mechanisms as in
Maskin and Tirole (1990). In the second stage, the responder chooses whether to participate
in the mechanism. If the responder accepts to participate in the mechanism, then in the
third stage the agents play the mechanism and the mechanism chooses the probability with
which a trade occurs and species the transfers to be paid by the buyer to the seller. Sellers
who trade permanently leave the market. Buyers remain in the economy until they have
purchased all the goods that they want, and then they leave the market and consume their
bundle. Agents who fail to trade return to the searching population. The distribution
of agents searching for trading partners is assumed to remain in steady state. Utility is
transferable. In particular, if a buyer of type b consumes bundle G, then she enjoys utility
hbG. A seller incurs cost rs when she sells her good. So trade between b and sellers s 2 G
creates total transferable utility fbG = hbG  
P
s2G rs.
2.1. Population of Types and Private Information. Let I and S denote the nite sets
of initial buyer and seller types. A seller's type species the good she owns, xs, and her
reservation value (or cost) rs. A buyer's initial type species the buyer's utility function
hi : P(S) ! R, where P(S) denotes the set of all subsets of S. The utility function satises:
(i) Normalization: hi; = 0,
(ii) Monotonicity: If G  A, then hiG  hiA,
(iii) Identity Independence: For any s and s0 with xs = xs0 (i.e., for sellers s and s0 who
own the same good), hiG[fsg = hiG[fs0g for all G.
Once in the market, a buyer's type changes after each trade and includes information on
all trades that the agent has made, and consequently, the goods that the buyer owns. So,
refer to a buyer type by b = iG, where i 2 I is the initial type, i.e., her utility function, and
G is the set of seller types with whom she has already traded. Consequently, the set of buyer
types, potentially available for trade in the market, is B = I  P(S). For b 2 B, G(b)  S
denotes the sellers with whom b has already traded; and i(b) 2 I denotes the initial type of
b. The notation b [ s denotes a type b0 with i(b) = i(b0) and G(b0) = G(b) [ fsg. Similarly,
the notation b n s denotes a type b0 with i(b) = i(b0) and G(b0) = G(b) n s.
In each period, a unit measure of each i 2 I and s 2 S are available to enter the market.
Consequently, in each period a measure jIj of buyers and measure jSj of sellers potentially
enter the market.3 Buyers and sellers, who do not enter the market in a given period, are
3The assumption that there is unit entry of each type is without loss of generality and is only for expositional
convenience.6 ALP E. ATAKAN
assumed to have opted for an outside option and are thus not available for entry in any
subsequent periods.
Let l = (l1;:::;lb;:::;ljBj;l1;:::;ljSj) denote the steady state measure of buyers and sellers
present in the market. The steady state probability for any seller of meeting buyer b, or









b2B lb and LS =
P
s2S ls. Assume that the agents know the distribution of
types in the economy.4 In particular, the (sub) probability measures pb and ps (or type
distributions) are commonly known by all agents. Observe that the population of types
available for entry in each period is a primitive of the model and is given exogenously. In
contrast, the steady state measure, l, is determined endogenously by the measure of agents
entering and exiting the market in each period.
The analysis here assumes independent private values. More precisely, if a buyer and
seller consummate a trade, then the payo to each agent depends on the terms of trade and
the agent's own private information; but does not depend on the trading partner's private
information, i.e., there is no \Lemons" problem. Reference to this assumption, which is
stated formally below, is omitted from the statements of the results presented since it is
maintained throughout the paper.
Assumption. Independent Private Values. If buyer b = iG and seller s meet, then
the buyer observes, xs, the good that seller s has for sale, while the buyer type b and seller
cost rs remain as private information.
2.2. Agent Behavior, Strategies and Beliefs. Let j denote a strategy for type j, j
denote beliefs for type j,  = (j)j2I denote a strategy prole, and  = (j)j2I denote
a prole of beliefs. The paper focuses on equilibria where all agents use stationary (time-
invariant) strategies (t =  for all t); beliefs are stationary (t =  for all t); and agents of
the same type use the same strategy and entertain the same beliefs. Since agents know the
distribution of types in the economy, an agent's belief that she will meet an agent of type j
coincides with the actual probability of meeting this agent (i.e., the steady state probability
of meeting j, pj). Consequently, an agent's belief at the start of any period is given by the
steady state distribution. At other points of the stage game played during a period, beliefs
4This requirement is stronger than what is needed for showing convergence to a competitive equilibrium. As
long as the support of any agent's prior belief about the distribution of agents in the economy coincides with
the support of the steady state distribution, the convergence results presented in the paper will continue to
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are obtained, where possible, using Bayes' rule by conditioning on equilibrium strategies as
well as observed characteristics and actions of their opponents for the period.5
At the start of each period, a strategy determines whether the agent remains in (or enters)
the market and pays the cost c. Denote by j(in) the probability that agent j remains in
(or enters) the market at the start of any period.
If j is paired in the current period and is the proposer, then the strategy j species a
mechanism. If agent j is the responder, then the strategy species whether she accepts to
participate in the mechanism. If the responder accepts to participate, then the agents send
messages chosen from the message space specied by the mechanism; and the mechanism
chooses a probability of trade and the transfer to be paid by the buyer to the seller.
Given a prole of strategies and beliefs, let the match probability mbs(;) (or msb(;))
denote the probability that b and s trade, given that the two are paired in the period and
b (or s) is chosen as the proposer. Let Mbs = Msb = mbs + (1   )msb denote the total
probability of trade, given that b and s are paired in the period. Also, let tbs(;) (or
tsb(;)) denote the expected transfer paid by the buyer to the seller, given that b and s
are paired in the period and b (or s) is chosen as the proposer.6 In what follows, match
probabilities and transfers will be denoted mij and tij with the dependence on  and 
suppressed for notational convenience.
The period reward for a buyer b equals hi(b)G(b) if the buyer chooses to exit the market at
the start of the period; equals  c if she chooses to remain in the market but fails to meet
a seller; and equals  c   tbs (or  c   tsb) if she gets to propose (or respond) to seller s.
Likewise, the period reward for a seller s equals zero if the seller chooses to exit the market
at the start of the period; equals  c if she chooses to remain in the market but fails to meet
a buyer; and equals  c + tsb (or  c + tbs) if she gets to propose (or respond) to buyer b. If
an agent has exited the market in a prior period, then the period reward for that agent is
equal to zero 0. Given that all other agent in the economy behave according to strategies
 and beliefs , each agent of type j chooses their strategy j to maximize their expected
discounted stream of utility.
2.3. Steady State. As stated earlier, the measure of agents in the economy is assumed to
remain in steady state (i.e., lt+1 = lt = l for all t). The steady state assumption requires
that the inow of type b buyers (or type s sellers) into the market in each period must equal
5Observe that all beliefs obtained through Bayes' rule are stationary as a consequence of the steady state
assumption on the distribution of types and the assumption that agents use stationary strategies. All other
belief, that is beliefs (conditional on zero probability events) that cannot be obtained using Bayes' rule, are
further assumed stationary.
6For example, if the probability of trade is mbs(;) and the buyer pays the seller t in case a trade occurs
and zero otherwise, then the expected transfer tbs(;) = mbst.8 ALP E. ATAKAN
the outow of that type exiting the market in each period. Consequently, given strategies
and implied match probabilities, the steady state measure must satisfy Equations (2), (3)
and (4) given below, in equilibrium. The left hand side of Equation (2) gives the outow
of type s sellers resulting from successful trades or voluntary exit from the market; and
the righthand side gives the inow of new type s sellers. The left side of the Equation (4)
(or Equation (3) for types with b(G) = ;) gives the outow of type b buyers resulting from
agents leaving the market or transforming into another type following a trade; and the right
hand side gives the inow of type b buyers via new entry or as a result of buyers of another




b2B pbMbs + s(out)) = s(in) (2)
lb(
X
s2S psMbs + b(out)) = b(in) (3)
for all types b 2 B with b(G) = ; and all sellers s 2 S, where b(out) = (1 
P
s2S psMbs)(1 
b(in)) denotes the fraction of type b buyers, who failed to trade in the previous period,
that choose to leave at start of the current period; and b(in)  1 is the ow of new buyers
into the market at the start of the period. Also,
(4) lb(
X
s2S psMbs + b(out)) = b(in)
X
s2G(b) lbnspsMbnss
for b 2 B with b(G) 6= ;, where b(in)
P
s2G(b) lbnspsMbnss is the measure of newly created
type b buyers who remain in the market, that is, buyer types, that were an \s" away from
type b, who traded with a type s in the previous period.
2.4. Search Equilibrium. A steady state search equilibrium is comprised of a strategy
prole , a prole of beliefs  and a steady state measure l, that are all mutually compatible.
That is to say, the measure l satises the steady state equations, given that agents behave
according to strategy prole  and the prole of belief ; and the strategy prole  and
belief , comprises a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the three-stage mechanism proposal
game, given that types are drawn according to the steady state measure l.
2.5. Values. Let vk denote the expected discounted value for a type k agent given match
probabilities m, expected transfers t, and steady state distibution of types p. The expected
future value at the start of a period for a buyer equals the maximum of the value of remaining
in the market and the value of leaving the market and consuming the bundle that she owns,
that is, vb = maxfvb(in);hbG(b)g. The value of remaining in the economy, vb(in), satises
the following Bellman equation:COMPETITIVE MATCHING 9









s ps(1   )msb)vb:
In words, buyer b pays the search (sampling) cost c, then successfully makes a trade as
the responder with seller s with probability (1 )psmsb; makes a trade when she proposes
to buyer s with probability psmbs; and does not trade in the period and receives her con-




s ps(1 )msb = 1 
P
s psMbs. The
expected future value at the start of a period for a seller equals the maximum of the value
of remaining in the market and the value of leaving the market, i.e., vs = maxfvs(in);0g.
The value of remaining in the economy for a seller, vs(in), is dened similarly to a buyer.
Rearranging the equations for vk(in) gives the following for buyers and sellers:
vs(in) =   c +
X
b2B pb(tbs + (1   )tsb   Mbs(rs + vs)) + vs
vb(in) =   c +
X
s2S ps(Mbs(vb[s   vb)   tbs   (1   )tsb) + vb
2.6. The Competitive Benchmark. The competitive equilibrium benchmark considered
here is a \ow" equilibrium as in Gale (1987) or Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007),
generalized to accommodate heterogenous goods and multi-unit demand. In each period,
ow supply is the measure of sellers of a particular good entering the market and ow
demand is the measure of agents willing to purchase a particular good entering the market.
In a ow equilibrium, the buyer and seller continuation values, which are the implicit prices,
equate ow supply to ow demand for each good that is traded in the market. It is well
known that the competitive equilibrium allocations for economy I[S are fully characterized
by the following linear program (and its dual) which is just the classical Assignment Problem
where fractional assignments are permitted. (See, for example, Roth and Sotomayor (1990).)
This formulation is a generalization of Shapley and Shubik (1972) to a setting where buyers
can purchase multiple commodities as in Kelso and Crawford (1982) or Gul and Stacchetti



















sG qiG  1 for all s; vi +
X
s2G vs  hiG  
X
s2G rs 8i;G: (5)
X
GS qiG  1 for all i: (6)
The vector q that solves the program is a competitive allocation and denotes the measure
of matches between buyer i and sellers in the set G that are created in each period of time.
Any vector v that solves the dual program is a competitive equilibrium utility vector and
the competitive price of a traded good is pxs = vs+rs. The constraint given by equation (5)




sG qiG, must be less than the
ow supply of that type, which is at most one. This constraint will bind, if the good's price
is positive, or more precisely, if vs > 0 and thus pxs = vs + rs > rs. The constraint given
by equation (6) states that the ow supply to buyers of type b, must be less than the ow
demand by type i, which is at most one. Again, this constraint will bind if vi > 0. Together
inequalities (5) and (6) ensure market clearing. Observe that, if q solves the primal and
v the dual, then each buyer consumes her most preferred bundle, sellers oer their good
only if pxs  rs, and all markets clear. Conversely, if q is a competitive allocation and p a
competitive price, then q solves the primal Assignment Problem by the rst welfare theorem;
and buyer values vi = maxGS hiG 
P
s2G pxs and seller values vs = maxf0;pxs  rsg solve
the dual Assignment Problem.7
3. Convergence to Competitive Equilibria
The development in this section analyzes the limit economy as search becomes costless,
i.e., as 4 ! 0. The analysis focuses on sequences of equilibria, the associated sequences
of equilibrium match probabilities mn, type distributions pn and values vn and their limit
(^ m; ^ p; ^ v). This section's main result, Theorem 1, shows that all trades take place at com-
petitive prices for the economy with agents in the set I [ ^ S, asymptotically. The set ^ S is
dened as the set of markets open at the limit. More precisely, ^ S is the set of sellers for
whom limn ln
s > 0. In general, ^ S need not equal S. That is, ^ S may be a proper subset of
S, and all markets may not be open at the limit. Consequently, trade may not occur at
competitive prices for the economy I[S. Example 1, at the end of the section outlines such
7The substitutes assumption of Kelso and Crawford (1982) or Gul and Stacchetti (1999, 2000) is not needed
here. This because there are a continuum of each type and so eectively fractional assignments are allowed.COMPETITIVE MATCHING 11
an example. The corollary to Theorem 1, Corollary 2, assumes that an arbitrarily small
fraction of sellers for each good x enter the market in every period. Under this assumption
Corollary 1 shows that all trade takes place at competitive prices for the whole economy
I [ S, asymptotically.
Let qiG denote the measure of buyers with initial type i 2 I leaving the market with
bundle G. Also, let
eiG = hiG  
X
s2G rs    vi  
X
s2G vs
denote the Excess between any initial buyer type i 2 I and sellers in the set G; and similarly
ebs = vb[s   vb   vs   rs
denote the excess between buyer b 2 B and seller s.
The proof of Theorem 1 rst establishes that the per-period exit rate of buyers with
goods in the set G (i.e., ^ qiG) is a feasible choice for the Assignment Problem, and so, the
ow creation of value in the economy is at most as large as the maximized value of the
Assignment Problem. The argument proceeds to show that the Excess between any initial
type i and sellers in the set G (i.e., ^ eiG) is non-positive. No Excess then implies that the
vector of equilibrium values v is a feasible choice for the dual of the Assignment Problem,
and consequently, that the ow creation of value in the economy is at least as large as the
maximized value of the Assignment Problem.8
Theorem 1. Suppose (qn;vn;pn) ! (^ q; ^ v; ^ p), let ^ S = fs 2 S : limsupln
s > 0g, then ^ q solves
the primal Assignment Problem and is a competitive equilibrium allocation for the economy
with agents in I [ ^ S; ^ v solves the dual Assignment Problem and is a competitive equilibrium
utility vector for the economy with agents in I [ ^ S; and ^ vs +rs is a competitive equilibrium
price for good xs.
Proof. Note that vk  0 since k has the option not to enter the market; the best buyer i
can do is to consume that agent's favorite bundle G without paying any transfers to any
sellers so vi   h = maxi;G hiG; the best seller j can do is to receive transfer  h without
incurring any costs so vj   h; and hence  (jSj + 1)( h +  r)  eiG   h, where  r = maxs rs.
Below it is shown that qiG  1 for all i and G. Consequently, the sequence (qn;en;vn;pn) is
included in a compact set and has a convergent subsequence. From hereon restrict attention
to convergent subsequences (qn;en;vn;pn) ! (^ q; ^ e; ^ v; ^ p).
Let b = iG and observe that, qiG, the measure of buyers with initial type i 2 I leaving











8Observe that the constraint of the dual Assignment Problem only requires No Excess.12 ALP E. ATAKAN
Note that li =
P
GS ln
iG is the measure of buyers, whose initial type was i, present in the
market. li is in steady state since it is the sum of measure ln
iG that are by assumption
in steady state measures. The measure of buyers, whose initial type was i, permanently
leaving the market in each period is
P
GS qn










s denotes the measure of agents who own the good that
initially belonged to a seller of type s and this measure is in steady state since it is a sum
of steady state variables. In each period, the measure of agents leaving with a good that






















s3G ^ qiG + ^ ls^ s(out)  1 for all s and
X
G ^ qiG  1 for all i:
This implies that the vector ^ q satises equation (5) and equation (6) and is feasible for the




GS ^ qiG(hiG  
X
s2G rs)  P:
By Lemma 3, given in the Appendix, ^ eiG  0 for all i and G , this implies that ^ v is feasible
for the dual and consequently,
P
I ^ vi +
P










GS ^ qbG(hiG  
X
s2G rs)











GS ^ qiG(hiG  
X
s2G rs)  P = D
and so ^ q is a competitive allocation and ^ v is a competitive equilibrium utility vector. 
Assumption (FD), stated below, posits that the choice of not-entering the market and
taking an outside option is not available for an arbitrarily small fraction "x > 0 of the lowest
cost seller type of each good, at the start of their rst period in the market. This choice
becomes available only after one period in the market. Consequently, "x 
P
xs=x ls for all
goods x. This assumption ensures that some sellers of each good enter the market and thereCOMPETITIVE MATCHING 13
are no coordination problems in entry that could result in a missing market. If the rst
draw was not for free, then no agent entering the economy is an equilibrium. Also, Example
1 at the end of the section, outlines a more robust demonstration of a coordination failure.
Assumption. Free First Draw (FD). In each period, there is "x > 0 entry by the lowest
cost seller of each good x. These sellers do not pay the cost c in the rst period.
The (FD) assumption allows one to show that, if a buyer waits long enough, then she
can meet a seller of any good and make this seller a take-it-or-leave-it oer. This drives the
Excess between any two agents to zero as search frictions vanish.
Corollary 1. Assume (FD). If (qn;vn) ! (^ q; ^ v), then ^ q solves the primal Assignment
Problem and is a competitive equilibrium allocation; ^ v solves the dual Assignment Problem
and is a competitive equilibrium utility vector; and ^ vs+rs is a competitive equilibrium price
for good xs.
Proof. To show convergence, ^ eiG  0 (no excess) is established for all G  S. If ^ eiG  0,
then the corollary follows from Theorem 1. Dene ^ S as in Theorem 1. Let jx denote the
lowest cost seller of good x and observe that fjxsgs2S  ^ S by assumption, where fjxsgs2S is
the set of lowest cost sellers in the market. Thus for any G  fjxsgs2S, and i 2 I, ^ eiG  0.
For any two sellers of good x, vs   vs0  vs(in)   vs0(in) and so,
(vs(in)   vs0(in))(1   )  
X
b2B pbmbs(rs0 + vs0   rs   vs)
+ (1   )
X
b2B pbmsb(rs0 + vs0   rs   vs)
Also, suppose, without loss of generality, that rs0  rs.
(vs   vs0)(1   )  ((rs0   rs)   (vs   vs0))
X
b2B Msb
vs   vs0  (rs0   rs)
P
b2B Msb
(1   ) + 
P
b2B Msb
 rs0   rs
Consequently, vs+rs  vs0 +rs0. For any set G of sellers, let H denote the set of sellers
where each s 2 G is replaced by jx(s), i.e., the lowest cost seller who owns the same good as
seller s. So, hiG = hiH, also, vs + rs  vs0 + rs0 for any s0 2 G and s 2 H with xs0 = xs.
Consequently,
eiG = hiG  
X
s2G(vs + rs)   vi  hiH  
X
s2H(vs + rs)   vi = eiH
However, en
iH ! ^ eiH  0 since H  fjxsgs2S. So, ^ eiG = limen
bG  limen
iH  0 proving that
^ eiG  0. 
As pointed out the condition outlined in Assumption (FD), or a similar condition im-
posed on the buyer side of the market, is also necessary in the following limited sense: if14 ALP E. ATAKAN
Assumption (FD) does not hold, then there exists a sequence of steady state equilibria
for an economy that fails to converge to a competitive equilibrium of that economy. The
following is such an example.
Example 1. Necessity of Assumption (FD). Consider an economy with two buyer
types and two seller types, where each buyer wants to purchase only one good and the two
seller types own two dierent goods. Let h12 = h21 = 0 and h11 = h22 = 1, that is h
is super-modular; buyer 1 likes seller 1's good and buyer 2 likes seller 2's good. Suppose
r1 = r2 = 0. Let  = 1. For any c  1=2, a unit measure of type 1 buyers and a unit
measure of type 1 sellers entering, no type 2 buyers or sellers entering and all meetings
resulting in a trade at a price of 1=2 is an equilibrium. Clearly such a sequence does not
converge to the competitive equilibrium of the economy. However, if a tiny fraction "2 of
type 2 sellers where to enter in each period, then for c  "2
1+"2 the buyers of type 2 would
also nd it protable to enter. This results in the markets for both goods operating and leads
to convergence to a competitive equilibrium.
4. Existence and Characterization of Steady State Search Equilibria
The main result in this section, Theorem 2, shows that, for any conguration of search
frictions, that is, for any  2 [0;1] and c > 0, a steady state search equilibrium exists.
Proposition 2 shows that, in this equilibrium, all proposers make take-it-or-leave-it oers.
Also, Corollary 2 to Theorem 2, establishes the existence of full-trade equilibria for small
search frictions and shows that these equilibria converge to a competitive equilibrium of the
whole economy I [ S.
First, the focus is on the analysis of the three-stage Bayesian game. As stated earlier,
in the rst stage of the game the proposer chooses a mechanism from the set of feasible
mechanisms, in the second stage the responder chooses whether to participate in the mech-
anism, and in the third stage, if the responder chooses to participate, then the two agents
simultaneously report their messages to the mechanism. A mechanism, , species a set of
feasible messages for the proposer and the responder; and for each pair of messages chosen
by the two agents, it species the probability of trade m and the expected transfer t to be
paid by the buyer to the seller. Let hbx = (vb[s   vb) denote the \dynamic" value for a
buyer trading with any seller that owns good x, that is, any s 2 Sx = fs : xs = xg.9 Also,
let ^ rs = rs +vs  0 denote a seller's \dynamic" reservation value. If a buyer meets a seller
of good x, then the buyer's and seller's prior beliefs about the other's type (i.e., the other's
dynamic value) is obtained using the steady state measure l; and, in the case of the buyer,
conditioning on s 2 Sx. Once the steady state measure and agent continuation values, and
9Observe that vb[s = vb[s0 for any s and s
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consequently the dynamic values, are xed, the three-stage Bayesian game played in each
period is identical to the extensive form game analyzed by Maskin and Tirole (1990). Con-
sequently, for any vector of dynamic values and any steady state measure, existence of an
perfect Bayesian equilibrium follows from Proposition 6 of Maskin and Tirole (1990), under
two additional assumptions retained by Maskin and Tirole (1990).10 First, assume that the
set of feasible mechanisms is the set of all nite mechanisms where the number of messages
available for each type of agent is nite. Second, assume that the players have access to a
public randomization device in the third stage of the game, that is, the randomization device
is available in the continuation game after a mechanism has been chosen by the proposer
and accepted by the responder.11
Proposition 1. For any steady state measure l and any vector of continuation values v,
there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the three-stage mechanism proposal game.
Moreover, in this equilibrium all proposers oer the same direct mechanism and all respon-
ders accept to participate.
Proof. Follows immediately from Maskin and Tirole (1990) Proposition 6. 
Having established that an equilibrium exists for the stage game the next proposition
characterizes equilibria for the stage game. In particular, the proposition argues that each
proposer making a take-it-or-leave-it oer to the responder is an equilibrium of the stage
game. Moreover, any equilibrium of the stage-game is payo equivalent to the equilibrium
where every proposer makes a take-or-leave-it oer. This property is a consequence of
quasilinear preferences and was established for the case where there are two agent types
by Maskin and Tirole (1990) and for the case where there are a continuum of agents and
the monotone hazard rate condition is satised by Yilankaya (1999). The argument here
generalizes the proof in Maskin and Tirole (1990) to the case of arbitrarily many discrete
types.
For any steady state measure l and continuation values v pick an equilibrium with strategy
and belief prole  and  for the three-stage game with the related match probabilities
10Maskin and Tirole (1990) consider a model where the number of possible types of the proposer is unre-
stricted but the number of possible types of the responder is restricted to two. Also in their model utilities
for the buyers are strictly concave. However, it can be easily veried that these restrictions are immaterial
for their proof of existence.
11This randomization device is needed to ensure that the equilibrium payo set is convex in the third stage
after any choice of mechanism. As in Maskin and Tirole (1990) the randomization device is not used on
the equilibrium path but is used to support o equilibrium path beliefs. In particular, the randomization
device facilitates the coordination of play on a particular Nash equilibrium if the subgame in the third stage,
dened by the choice of mechanism, has multiple Nash equilibria.16 ALP E. ATAKAN
and expected transfers m and t.12 Consider the case when a seller s 2 Sx is chosen as the
proposer and let V s denote the expected value for a seller if that seller makes a take-it-or-
leave-it oer when that seller is chosen as the proposer. Since the take-it-or-leave-it oer is
always available to a seller and can be implemented irrespective of the buyer's beliefs about
the seller's type, the expected payo in the three-stage game when proposing must exceed




sb^ rs)  V s.
The following optimization maximizes the total expected utility for all sellers of good
x ignoring the incentive compatibility constraints for the various seller types. Since the
seller incentive constraints are ignored, the mechanism identied by the program might not
be chosen by the sellers in the game even though the expected total utility of all seller is





pbls(tsb   msb^ rs)
subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality:
X
S ls(msjhb   tsj) 
X
S ls(msbhb   tsb) 8b;j 2 B (bj) (ICbj)
0 
X
S ls(ms1h1   ts1) ( ) (IR)
msb  1 (sb)
where the Lagrange multipliers are given to the right. The equilibrium match probabilities
and expected transfers are incentive compatible and individually rational. So, in particular,




sb^ rs). The following proposition shows that the expected value from
all sellers making a take-it-or-leave-it-oer exceeds the value of the above maximization
problem, i.e.,
P




sb^ rs). Consequently, the expected




sb^ rs) must equal V s. Also, since each seller's expected
equilibrium payo in any equilibrium equals V s, each seller making a take-it-or-leave-it-oer
is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the stage game, where o-equilibrium path beliefs and
play, are given by any other equilibrium belief and strategy prole pair ;.13
12As a consequence of the Inscrutability Principle of Myerson (1983) all proposers oering the same direct
mechanism given by m
 and t
, all responders accepting and then truthful revelation is also an equilibrium
for the three-stage game where equilibrium path beliefs never change and are given by l and o equilibrium
path actions and beliefs are given by 
;
.
13The take-it-or-leave-it oer is incentive compatible and individually rational given any equilibrium beliefs
for the proposer since it gives the proposer their equilibrium payo and also is trivially incentive compatible
and individually rational for the responder.COMPETITIVE MATCHING 17
Proposition 2. For any steady state measure l and any vector of continuation values v,
in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the three-stage game, the proposer's payo is equal
to the payo the proposer would have received had she made an optimal take-it-or-leave-it
oer to the responder. Also, each proposer making an optimal take-it-or-leave-it oer is a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the three-stage game.
Proof. The problem for a seller s 2 Sx, when the seller's reservation value ^ rs is known by
the potential buyers, is given by the following maximization problem
V s = maxm;t0
X
B pb(tbs   mbs^ rs)
hbmjs   tjs  hbmbs   tbs (s
bj) (ICs
bj)
0  h1m1s   t1s ( s) (IRs)
mbs  1 (s
b)
Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) showed that a appropriately chosen take-it-or-leave-it oer is
optimal when a seller's cost is know and consequently must solve the above program. Let
m0
s and t0
s solve problem V s for each s. The choice m = (m0
s) and t = (t0
s) is feasible for
problem V : m0
s and t0
s satises the (ICs) and (IRs) constraints for each s consequently
m = (m0
s) and t = (t0
s) satisfy (IC) and (IR) for problem V , since these constraints are l
weighted sums of constraints (ICs) and (IRs). This implies that V 
P
s lsV s. The dual








j2B(hbbj   hjjb)  sb + pb^ rs 8b 6= 1;s; (Mb)
X
j2B(jb   bj) + pb  0 8b 6= 1; (Tb)
X
j2B(h11j   hjj1) + h1   s1 + p1^ rs 8s; (M1)
X
j2B(j1   1j) + p1   : (T1)









jb)  pb^ rs + s












j1) + h1 s  p1^ rs + s
1: (T1s)
By Lemma 5 in the appendix, one can pick multipliers s
bj = bj for all b;j and s;  s = 1
for all s ; and s such that ,   and s solve the dual problems Ds for each s. That is, there
are dual solutions s; s;s for the dual problems Ds where the s and the  s components
are equal across all s. Observe if ,   and s satisfy the constraints (Mbs) and (M1s) for all
b and s , then ,   and s satisfy constraints (Mb) and (M1) for problem (D). Likewise if 
and   satisfy constraints (Tbs ) and (T1s) for all b and s, then  and   satisfy constraints
(Tb) and (T1) for problem D. Consequently, ,   and  = (s)s2Sx is a feasible solution for








and thus proving the result. 
The main theorem, proved in this subsection, establishes that an equilibrium exists, for
any  2 [0;1] and c > 0. In the model presented here, without an assumption along the
lines of (FD), a trivial no-trade equilibrium always exists. Consequently, for a meaningful
existence result, the theorem below posits (FD) and establishes the existence of an equi-
librium with trade, that is an equilibrium where the markets for all the goods are open.
The proof of the theorem involves a straight forward application of Kakutani's xed point
theorem on a mapping dened from the set of feasible measures l, strategy proles  and
values v, into itself.
Theorem 2. Assume (FD). For any (c;) a search equilibrium (l;) exists.
Example 1 demonstrated that without (FD) there may exist sequences of equilibria that
fail to converge to competitive equilibria. The following corollary to Theorem 2 drops
Assumption (FD) but maintains the two additional assumptions outlined below. Corollary
2 shows that there exists a sequence of equilibria that converges to a competitive equilibrium
for the economy.
The rst additional assumption (UNQ), requires that the set of goods traded in any
competitive is unique, that is, the same goods are traded in any competitive equilibrium.
It should be pointed out that this assumption is automatically satised in economies with
an homogeneous good such as Gale (1987) and Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007), whichCOMPETITIVE MATCHING 19
are special cases of the economy under consideration here. Also, the assumption is satised
generically for the economies that we consider.14
Assumption. Uniqueness (UNQ). The set of goods traded in any competitive equilibrium
is the same. That is if good x is not traded in one competitive equilibrium, then it is not
traded in any other CE.
Assumption (DR) requires the goods in the economy are substitutes for each other from
the point of view of all buyers. This assumption is always trivially satised in a subset of
the economies consider here where buyers have unit demand preferences.
Assumption. Decreasing Returns (DR). If G  H, then hbH[fsg hbH  hbG[fsg hbG
for all b and s.
The argument for the corollary is as follows: First x the set of goods traded in any
competitive equilibrium. Assume that a small measure of the lowest cost seller of each
of these goods enters in each period, i.e., (FD) holds for the traded goods. Given this
assumption a sequence of equilibria, that converges to a competitive equilibrium exists
by Corollary 1 and Theorem 2. However, if the measure of sellers with (FD) is picked
suciently small, then for suciently small cn and 1   n, the measure of sellers of the
traded goods entering the economy must exceed the measure of sellers entering due to the
(FD) assumption. Consequently, the (FD) assumption is non-binding and can be dropped
thus proving the existence of the desired sequence of convergent equilibria. The convergent
sequence, however, converges to an competitive equilibrium for the economy where the set
of traded goods is a subset of the set of all goods. Assumption (DR) is then used to show
that this also a Competitive Equilibrium for the set of all goods.
Corollary 2. Assume (UNQ) and (DR). There exists a sequence (qn;vn) ! (^ q; ^ v), such
that ^ q solves the primal Assignment Problem and is a competitive equilibrium allocation;
^ v solves the dual Assignment Problem and is a competitive equilibrium utility vector; and
^ vs + rs is a competitive equilibrium price for good xs.
Proof. By (UNQ), the set of goods can be partitioned into two sets H  X and X n H
where H denotes the set of goods that are traded in any competitive equilibrium. Let qx
denote the measure of good x traded by the lowest cost sellers of good x, i.e., by sellers
Sx = fs : xs = x and rs  r0









14This is because the linear program that characterizes the set of competitive allocations generically has a
unique solution.20 ALP E. ATAKAN
Also, let qx = minq2Qqx where Q denotes the set of competitive allocations. Note that
Q is a compact and convex set and qx > 0 for any x 2 H. Assume (FD) for all x 2 H
and let the measure of low cost sellers of good x 2 H receiving the rst draw free be
0 < "x < qx. Observe that given this set-up, the sequence of equilibria will converge to ^ q,
which is competitive equilibrium for the economy comprised of sellers such that xs 2 H and
b 2 B. Also, observe that since only goods in H are traded, q is also an ecient allocation
for the original economy I. For any buyer b with ^ lb > 0, ^ ebG  0 for any G  S. For
any buyer with ^ lb = 0, ^ ebG  0 for any G  fs : xs 2 X n Hg. This is because otherwise,
i.e., is ^ ebG > 0, then allocating to b, who is not trading, the goods in G, which are not
being traded, would improve the eciency of the matching which would contradict that the
matching ^ q is ecient. So ^ ebG  0 for G  fs : xs 2 X n Hg. Also, for ^ lb = 0, ^ ebG  0 for
any G  fs : xs 2 Hg. But, ^ ebG  0 for G  fs : xs 2 Hg and G  fs : xs 2 X n Hg in
conjunction with (DR) implies that ^ ebG  0 for all b and G  S. This, in turn, shows that
the allocation ^ q is a competitive equilibrium allocation for I and ^ v is a competitive utility
vector.
Now observe that for suciently large n, n
sx(in) > "x since the measure of lowest cost
sellers leaving the market must converge to competitive competitive equilibrium which ex-
ceeds qx. This implies that for n suciently large vs(in)  0. This shows that we can drop
the (FD) assumption which is not binding for suciently large n and just take entry by
type sx to equal n
sx(in). 
5. Discussion and Conclusion
This paper presented a model where buyers purchase a bundle of indivisible, heteroge-
neous goods from sellers who are each endowed with one unit of a good. Trade takes place
in a decentralized market under two sided incomplete information. A small measure of the
lowest cost seller of each good is assumed to sample the market at least once. Under this
assumption an equilibrium is shown to exist (Theorem 2) and any sequence of equilibria is
shown to converge to a competitive equilibrium.
The model presented here considered the case where agents bargain pairwise, where
as other studies in the literature, such as Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007), analyze
bargaining in larger coalitions. The convergence result is not sensitive to this assumption. In
particular, the results presented here are robust to any random matching technology as long
as any buyer and seller whose exist with positive measure in the economy meet with positive
probability. Also, the analysis proceeded under the assumption of two sided incomplete
information. However, all the results presented also go through without alteration under
complete information. Finally, a central assumption in the model maintained throughout
the paper was that the economy remains in steady state. An immediate way to extendCOMPETITIVE MATCHING 21
this model is to drop the steady state assumption and consider a non-stationary market
with nitely many, instead of a continuum, of agents entering in each period. Under such a
formulation, the goal would be to show that trade always occurs at competitive prices and
that the market clears on average.
Appendix A. Omitted Proofs
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1 (No Excess 1). If maxf^ pb; ^ psg > 0, then ebs  0.
Proof. For any c and  a seller (or buyer) can oer to sell her good for vb[s   vb   "
and ensure that buyer b purchases if they meet, since the payo that buyer b gets from
purchasing the good strictly exceeds her continuation payo nvb. Also, any buyer can oer
to buy a good for rs + vs + ", and ensure that she makes a purchase if she meets seller s.
Consequently, for any c and 
vs   c + (1   )pb(vb[s   vb   rs) + (1   (1   )pb)vs
(1   )vs   c + (1   )pb(vb[s   vb   vs   rs), and
(1   )vb   c + ps(vb[s   vb   vs   rs):
So
lim
n (1   n)vn
s  lim




n (1   n)vn
b  lim
n  cn + pn
sen
bs:
Taking limits shows that ^ pb^ ebs  0 and ^ ps^ ebs  0. However, since maxf^ pb; ^ psg > 0; ^ ebs 
0. 
Lemma 2. Let Ln = maxfLn
B;Ln
Sg, limn cnLn = 0 and limn(1   n)Ln = 0.
Proof. If limsupLn < 1, then since 0  Ln, limn cnLn = 0 and limn(1   n)Ln = 0.
If limsupLn = 1, then either (inclusive) limsupLn
b = 1 or limsupLn
s = 1. Assume,
limsupLn = 1 and, without loss of generality, that limsupLn
b  limsupLn
s. For lb > 0,
vb = vb(in) and thus the following equation is satised for all b 2 B,
(1   )lbvb + lbc =
X
s2S lbps(Mbs(vb[s   vb)   tbs   (1   )tsb)









ps(Mbs(vb[s   vb)   tbs   (1   )tsb)22 ALP E. ATAKAN
Individual rationality for any seller s implies that
P
B pb(tbs+(1 )tsb Mbs(rs+vs))  0















where ^ B = fB : ^ pb > 0g. In Lemma 1 it was shown that (1   )vb + c  psebs for each b
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 > 0. Consequently, for t suciently small















































The assumption of steady state implies that
P

















By the denition of ^ B, limn
P
Bn ^ B pn
b = 0, limn
P
b2B pn
b = 1 and limn 1 
P













































However, if ^ pb > 0, then limn en
















Lemma 3. ^ eiG  0 for all i 2 I and G  ^ S.
Proof. By the argument provided in Lemma 1, for i 2 I,
(1   n)vn















However, by Lemma 2,
limn((1   n)vn
i + cn)Ln = 0:
Also, by assumption, limLnpn
s = limln
s > 0 for all s 2 ^ S, and consequently,
^ vifsg   ^ vb   ^ vs   rs  0:
Also, again by the argument provided in Lemma 1,
((1   n)vn





So, ^ vifs;s2g   ^ vifsg   ^ vs2   rs2  0. Substituting gives
^ vifs;s2g   ^ vi   ^ vs2   ^ vs   rs   rs2  0
Repeating jGj times shows that
^ viG   ^ vi  
X
s2G(^ vs + rs)  0:
However, vn
iG  hiG for all n and so ^ viG  hiG. Thus
hiG   ^ vi  
X
s2G(^ vs + rs)  0
proving the result. 
Lemma 4.
P
i2I ^ vi +
P




G ^ qiG(hiG  
P
s2G rs).
Proof. The value equations for the buyers implies
lbvb(1   )  
X
s lbpsmbs(b[s(in)(vb[s   hi(b)G(b[s)) + hi(b)G(b[s)   vb   tbs)
+ (1   )
X
s lbpsmsb(b[s(in)(vb[s   hi(b)G(b[s)) + hi(b)G(b[s)   vb   tsb)24 ALP E. ATAKAN
Summing up over all buyers and taking the limit as  ! 1 and observing that tbs goes to






















b2B ^ qi(b)G(b)(hi(b)G(b)   ^ vi(b)  
X





G ^ qiG(hiG   ^ vi  
X
j2G(^ vj + rj))
Observe that for i with ^ vi > 0
P




sG ^ qbG = 1 so
X
i2I ^ vi +
X




G ^ qiG(hiG  
X
s2G rs)
proving the result. 
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2. Let the buyers in the set B are arranged in decreasing
order of their dynamic value with h1 being the lowest and hjBj the highest dynamic buyer
value. For the proposition we need to show that there exists ,   and (s)s2Sx such that ,
  and s solve Ds for each s where the  and   are independent of s . In the case where the
marginal revenue is decreasing, this is straight forward. Suppose that the marginal revenue
is increasing in b for all b 2 B, that is,




is increasing in b. Set  s =   =
PjBj
b=1 pb = 1 for all s; s
b;b 1 = b;b 1 =
PjBj
k=b pk and all
other bk = 0 for all s; and s













pb^ rs + s






jb) = pbb  pb^ rs + s
b = pb maxfb; ^ rsg











pk + pb = 0
and so (Tbs) is satised. Consequently, these multipliers satisfy all constraints for the dual
optimization problems Ds.
In the case where the marginal revenue is not necessarily decreasing, the argument is
more involved. The following lemma proves the general result.
Lemma 5. There exists ,   and (s)s2Sx such that ,   and s solve Ds for each s.
Proof. Observe that the optimal solution to each V s is a take it or leave it oer. In an
optimum for the primal optimization problem V s the upward incentive constraints, i.e,
(ICs
jb) where j < b, never bind so always take jb = 0 if j < b.
The proof is by induction. Take   = 1. Pick  such that (;1;s) 2 argminDs for all
s = 2;:::;jSxj with r2 < r3:::  rjSxj. I show that there exists 0 such that (0;1;s) 2
argminDs for all s = 1;2;:::;jSxj with r1 < r2 < r3:::  rjSxj.
Let b(s)  minbfms
b > 0;(m;t) 2 argmaxV sg. Choose (;1;s) 2 argminDs s =
2;:::;jSxj such that the primal solution has m2
b(2) > 0. Observe for b > b(2) and k < b(2),
bk = 0. This is because bk is the multiplier associated with ICs
bk which holds strictly.
Also, let b(2)k = 0 for all k > 1 and let bk = 0 for all b < b(2) and k  1. This works
because all constraints (IC2
b(2)k) are identical and have righthand sides equal to zero, and
all constraints (IC2
bk) for all b < b(2) and k  1 the same and have both left and righthand
sides equal to zero. Summing over all constraints (Tb2) (which hold strictly since they are









bk) + pb(2) +
X
k>b(2)





For b < b(2), s






hkkb = pbrs + s
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since the multiplier Mbs > 0 for all b  b(2).
Claim 1. There exists (1;1;0) 2 argminD1 such that 1
bj = bj for b  b(2) and
j > b(2) and b = 2
b + (r2   r1)pb for b  b(2).
Proof. Take the alternative maximization problem where all buyers with valuation hb  hb(2)
are viewed as one buyer with mass
P
bb(2) p(b) and valuation hb(2). This maximization has
an identical solution (to the maximization problem under consideration) for seller r1. Pick
the multipliers 1
bj for b  b(2) and j < b(2) and 0
b for b < b(2) using the alternative
maximization problem and set 1
bj = bj for b  b(2) and j > b(2) and 0
b = 2
b +(r2 r1)pb
for b  b(2). These multipliers satisfy dual constraints and solve the dual maximization
problem. 
Claim 2. Pick (1;1;0) 2 argminD1 from Claim 1. There exists 0  1
b such that
1




k  (hb   r1)
b(2) 1 X
k=b




for all b(1)  b < b(2). Also, for (1;1;0) 2 argminD1 from Claim 1, 1
k = 0













k=b(2) pk) < 0 for any b < b(2) because otherwise b(2) would not be the
cut-o type for seller with cost r2. Shue 1












k<b bk = pb +
P
k>b kb, gives




Claim 3. There exists (0;1;s) 2 argminDs for s = 2;:::;jSxj such that 1
b(2) 1 identi-
ed in Claim 2 with 0 satisfy dual constraints (Mb(2)   11) and (Tb(2)   11) for problem
D1. Also, this process can be repeated so that 1 and 0 satisfy dual constraints (Mk1)
and (Tk1) for all k for problem D1.COMPETITIVE MATCHING 27
Proof. Pick (as above) (;1;s) 2 argminDs s = 2;:::;jSxj. Let b = b(2) 1. Observe that
b(2);1 =
P
kb(2) pk: For zb 2 [0;1] set 0














The denition of b(0(zb)) presumes that (Tb1) hold with equality. Observe that if zb = 0,
then b(0(0)) = pb(hb   r1)  pb minfr2   r1;hb   r1g  1
b and
@b(0(0))
@zb < 0: Also,
b(0(1)) = (hb   r1)pb   (
X
kb(2)
pk)(hb(2)   hb)  1
b
by Claim 2. Consequently, there exists zb 2 [0;1] such that b(0(zb)) = 1
b. For b   1
set 0
b(2);b 1 = zb 1(1   zb)b(2)1, 0





















that (Tb1) hold with equality. Observe that 
0

















































































b(2)b(1)   r1pb(1) = b(1)(0)
proving the result. 




b = (hb(1)   r1)
P
pb and 0 and 1 satisfy all constraints of the problem D1 thus
completing the proof. 
A.3. Proof of Theorem 2.
Proof. The argument identies a candidate equilibrium where each proposer chooses an op-
timal mechanism as if their type is observed (the take-it-or-leave-it oer is a optimal choice),
and the steady state measure and values are consistent with the matching probabilities and
transfer payments generated by these optimal mechanisms. The candidate equilibrium is
generated via a xed point argument outlined below. Proposition 2 implies that the take-
it-or-leave oer that solves the mechanism choice problem where the proposer's type is
observed (or any other solution) is also a solution to the mechanism choice problem where
the proposer's type is private information for appropriately chosen o-equilibrium path be-
liefs . Consequently, the candidate equilibrium is an equilibrium for the economy with the
o equilibrium path beliefs given by .
For any c and , 0  vi   h. Let V = fv 2 RjIj2jSj+jSj : 0  vi   hg denote the set of
possible values.
Let s = x, if s is the lowest cost seller of good xs and s = 0 otherwise. For all
i 2 I and s 2 S, if vs(in) < 0, then ls = s by Assumption (FD), and if vi(in) < 0, then
li = 0. If vs(in)  0, then ls = 1=(
P
b2T pbMbs + s(out)). For i 2 I, if vi(in)  0, then
li = 1=(
P
s2S Mis + i(out)). Also, if b(in)
P






s2S psMbs + b(out)
:
Observe that vj(in)   c+
P
k pkMjk h and so c= h 
P
k pkMjk. Consequently, 1  lj 
 h
c . Let  = fl : 1  lj 
 h
cg denote the set of possible steady state measures. Let mbs andCOMPETITIVE MATCHING 29
transfer tbs be the mechanism choice by the buyers and msb and tsb the mechanism choice























for b 2 B
where the M's are calculated according to . This denes a continuous function from
    V into , where (l;;v) 7! l0





b)0  c + 
X
ps(m0
bs(vb[s   vb)   t0
bs)
+ (1   )
X
s




bs(rs + vs)  t0
bj   m0
bj(rs   vs) for all s and j 2 S
t0
bs   m0
bs(rs + vs)  0 for all s
m0
bs  1 for all s:
Also, let S0
b;1(l;;v) denote the set of maximizers for the above program. Observe that
the objective function of this maximization problem is continuous and concave in m and
t, and the constraint set, dened by linear inequalities, is non-empty (m = 0 and t = 0 is
always feasible), convex and compact for any choice of (l;;v) 2 V . Consequently,
v0
b(injl;;v) is a continuous function of (l;;v) and S0
b;1(l;;v) is a upper-hemi-continuous




b(in;l;;v) + (1   0)hbG(b)
S0
b;0(l;;v) = arg max
02fin;outg
0v0
b(in;l;;v) + (1   0)hbG(b):
Again, by the same reasoning as above, since v0
b(in;l;;v) is continuous, v0(l;;v) is con-
tinuous, S0
b;0(l;;v) is UHC, nonempty, convex and compact valued.











b2B pb(tbs + mbs(rs + vs)) + vs30 ALP E. ATAKAN
subject to
m0
sb(vb[s   vb)   t0
sb  m0
sj(vb[s   vb)   t0
sj for all b and j 2 B
m0
sb(vb[s   vb)   t0
sb  0 for all b
m0
sb  1 for all b
Also, let S0


















correspondence (l;;v) 7! (l0;S0;v0). This correspondence maps V into V ,
is UHC, compact, and convex valued; thus by Kakutani's theorem has a xed point. This
xed point is an equilibrium for the economy. 
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